In North Macedonia, politics doesn't only shape how the country is governed, but also how different communities perceive and build relationships with one another. Ethnic affiliation remains present in political discourse, in the competition between parties, and in how institutional decisions are interpreted, while identity-based rhetoric can often deepen divisions instead of overcoming them.
This becomes especially visible among young people, who, alongside the influence of family, school, and their surrounding environment, also face hate speech and polarization in the digital space.
But are political parties only part of the problem, or can they also become a factor bringing communities closer together? How much space do institutions create for contact and cooperation among young people, and what needs to change so that coexistence doesn't remain just a political concept?
We spoke about these issues, and about the impact of politics on interethnic relations, with political scientist Naim Iljazi, who believes that the path toward a more cohesive society requires functional institutions, media literacy, and a transformation of political language. Why shouldn't North Macedonia also follow Belgium's example?
How much does politics influence the way communities in North Macedonia see one another?
To understand how and to what extent institutional developments shape mutual interethnic perceptions, we first need to analyze how party-political factors instrumentalize identity narratives in the Republic of North Macedonia. To get a clearer picture, it's necessary to look back to 2001, when academic circles in Macedonia put forward a proposal for the territorial reconfiguration of the country, one that envisioned dividing Macedonia and merging certain areas with Albania and Kosovo.
In the practice of diplomatic negotiations, every initial proposal serves as a starting point for discussion, where the other side puts forward its own counterproposals, aiming to reach a balanced compromise through mutual concessions. However, the post-war circumstances in the region made this scenario extremely dangerous. Documents from that time, and data published by various platforms, showed that certain neighboring countries had territorial claims over Macedonia.
Implementing such an idea of territorial division would have triggered a chain reaction, putting the very existence of the Macedonian state at risk. The Albanian political factor refused to get involved in this dynamic, which was heading toward dissolution. Through a pragmatic approach and institutional responsibility, the logic of new conflicts was avoided, and the process turned instead toward an internal political solution. This process resulted in the signing of the Ohrid Agreement, which became the legal and political foundation for preserving the territorial unity of modern Macedonia.
From this retrospective, we understand that today the influence of politics on relations between communities is fundamental, because North Macedonia remains a society structured according to a consociational model (meaning that ethnicity is a constitutional basis in state-building), where ethnicity has been the main organizing category of political life ever since the Ohrid Agreement.
This means that every election, every governing coalition, and every political crisis is automatically interpreted through the lens of relations between communities. Without a doubt, this creates what is known as politicized identity, where ethnic affiliation no longer remains simply a private cultural trait, but becomes a category through which people read their everyday reality, the budget, public sector employment, even local infrastructure, as a tool against discrimination and the domination of one community over another.
Do political parties deepen ethnic divisions, or can they also be a unifying factor?
Both sides of the coin are used as mechanisms by political actors, and the difference lies in the logic of competition and the complexes within the ethnic groups themselves. When parties from the same community compete with one another to appear the most patriotic in defending ethnic interests, we enter into what we in political science call "ethnic outbidding," a spiral in which each actor tries to outdo the other in identity-based rhetoric, because this makes it easier to dominate electorally than competing on socio-economic programs that would actually advance the country.
And when this political society, with its conservative pathology, exhausts its internal rhetoric on interethnic relations, then, to keep these sterile debates going, it creates its own monsters, both within the region and beyond. Still, although citizens may be more easily mobilized on an emotional level, organized political structures remain far more cohesive and internally homogeneous than the general public. However, among citizens themselves, this reflection is still missing when it comes to political organization, one that would serve as a tool for increasing trust between communities.
Is the younger generation less burdened by political ethnic divisions, or is it still influenced by party discourse and the environment it lives in?
The younger generation is showing a tendency, or rather a shift, in violence, moving from the physical toward the verbal and digital. Perhaps due to a lack of digital hygiene, verbal and digital violence remains one of the biggest challenges, both for the government and for citizens themselves. Hate speech is commonly, and often instrumentally, misused to drive ethnic and political division, and political actors undoubtedly benefit from this discourse.
This dynamic reveals a pronounced institutional and educational gap, where the lack of media literacy and public awareness leaves room for manipulating public opinion, especially among the younger generation. The younger generation isn't born with hostility, it grows up within institutional channels that keep interethnic contact minimal until adulthood.
How much do institutions and state policies influence the creation of spaces where young people from different communities can grow closer?
The failure to implement the Law on Youth Participation and Youth Policies, particularly at the local self-government level, along with the repeated missing of legal deadlines, is directly reflected in the lack of spaces where young people from different communities can come together and build bridges of communication.
In a society that is territorially and politically segregated, interethnic contact never happens on its own, without active institutional intervention. Gordon Allport's intergroup contact hypothesis clearly explains that interaction between communities reduces prejudice only under specific conditions, such as when young people share equal status, when common goals exist, when cooperation replaces competition, and when the entire process enjoys institutional support.
This theoretical framework highlights the absolute necessity of implementing the law, turning it into a functional tool for social integration around one's "own axis" first, and only afterward can European integration be pursued.
What needs to change in politics so that coexistence doesn't remain just a slogan, but becomes part of everyday life?
At least four fundamental shifts are needed here. First, politics needs to turn the Ohrid Agreement from a formal institutional architecture into functional everyday practice, freeing it from the logic of winners and losers.
Second, the Law on Youth Participation and Youth Policies needs to be fully implemented, since it directly affects the education of the younger generation, especially at the local level, so that interethnic contact among young people no longer depends on spontaneity but on necessity.
Third, in parallel, investment is needed in citizens' digital hygiene and media literacy, so that online hate speech stops being a tool in the hands of politics and instead becomes a matter of civic awareness.
Fourth, and perhaps the hardest one, a fundamental transformation of political language itself is needed, moving away from rhetoric of victimization, domination, or threatening the other, and toward a language that isn't seen as a concession, but as a vital necessity.
This means treating coexistence not simply as a peaceful obligation, but as a genuine, shared interest, one tied to state-building, the economy, and European integration. Belgium's example is significant and instructive for us, because despite the tensions between the Flemish and Walloon communities, the state remains functional because coexistence is built on institutional rules and mechanisms of mutual protection between communities.
This shows that stability doesn't necessarily require "emotional harmony," but rather institutions strong enough to sustain coexistence even when politics fails.
